Many theorists have argued that the meaningfulness of a life is related in some way to the narrative or story that can be told about that life. Relationists claim that a life gains in meaning when a particular set of “narrative relations” obtain between the events that constitute it. Recountists claim that it is the telling of a story about those relations, not the relations themselves, that confers meaning. After identifying problems with existing versions of both of these positions, this (...) paper introduces a new and more satisfying variant of Recountism, centered on the old-fashioned idea that a meaningful life is, in part, an intelligible one. I argue that personal narration does play a role in a meaningful life and that my “Fitting Story” account provides the best explanation of how and why that is so. (shrink)

If global distributive justice or injustice is to exist, there must be something that is just or unjust: something to which the moral assessments at issue attach. I argue in this paper against one popular candidate for that role: the “global basic structure.” I argue that principles of distributive justice that target the global basic structure fail to satisfy a crucial “action guidance” desideratum and that this problem points to an alternative target that philosophers of global justice have yet to (...) widely acknowledge. We ought to exclusively direct our principles at subspheres of global politics: disaggregating global justice for a disaggregated world. (shrink)

This article identifies the main issues of justice that arise in international trade and critically evaluates contemporary philosophical debates over how to understand them. I focus on three central questions of distributive justice, as applied to trade. What is it about trade that makes it a subject of justice? Which aspects of the international trading system should our principles of justice regulate? What do duties of justice or fairness in trade demand? I show how debates over these questions turn not (...) only on empirical disagreements specific to trade but also on deeper and more general disputes in moral and political philosophy. I argue that trade is a domain in which diverse moral concerns complexly intersect and that a satisfying account of it must do justice to this complexity by itself exhibiting substantial pluralism. (shrink)

any of us think that we have duties of distributive justice towards our fellow citizens that we do not have towards foreigners. Is that thought justified? This paper considers the nature of the state's relationship to distributive justice from the perspective of utilitarianism, a theory that is barely represented in contemporary philosophical debates on this question. My strategy is to mount a utilitarian case for state-specific duties of distributive justice that is similar in its basic structure to the one that (...) is standardly mounted for special duties towards the near and dear. I begin with a discussion of whether or not the co-citizen relationship can be justified in terms of its welfare consequences. I then consider what the answer to that first question implies concerning the duties of distributive justice that arise within that relationship. (shrink)

The small portion of philosophical work on global distributive justice that directly discusses particular agents, institutions or practices in global politics tends to focus on a narrow range of the existing set. The emphasis is chiefly on bilateral diplomacy or intergovernmental organisations, to the neglect of a variety of more recent forms of transnational governance, many of which incorporate non‐state actors, have more limited membership, involve informal and dynamic structures, employ cooperative and reflexive methods for ensuring compliance, and operate largely (...) out of the public eye. This article considers how philosophers should conceive of distributive justice in relation to these neglected sites of transnational governance, using the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) as an illustration. (shrink)

Offers a philosophical perspective on the nature and value of writing a memoir. Artful Truths offers a concise guide to the fundamental philosophical questions that arise when writing a literary work about your own life. Bringing a philosopher’s perspective to a general audience, Helena de Bres addresses what a memoir is, how the genre relates to fiction, memoirists’ responsibilities to their readers and subjects, and the question of why to write a memoir at all. Along the way, she delves into (...) a wide range of philosophical issues, including the nature of the self, the limits of knowledge, the idea of truth, the obligations of friendship, the relationship between morality and art, and the question of what makes a life meaningful. Written in a clear and conversational style, it offers a resource for those who write, teach, and study memoirs, as well as those who love to read them. With a combination of literary and philosophical knowledge, de Bres takes the many challenges directed at memoirists seriously, while ultimately standing in defense of a genre that, for all its perplexities—and maybe partly because of them—continually proves to be both beloved and valuable. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 26 Under which conditions does the relation between the levels of benefit and burden held by distinct individuals become a concern of justice? Associativists argue that principles of comparative distributive justice apply only among those persons who share some form of association; humanists argue that some such principles apply among all human persons qua human persons. According to the “weak associativist” account that I defend, humanism is wrong, but so are current versions of associativism. Association is (...) necessary if talk of comparative distributive justice is to be apt, but no special form of it is required. Whether or not principles of comparative distributive justice do in fact apply to an association will depend on whether or not the conditions for legitimate enforcement of the resulting duties are satisfied, and we can expect these conditions to be satisfied by a wide range of associative forms. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 26 Under which conditions does the relation between the levels of benefit and burden held by distinct individuals become a concern of justice? Associativists argue that principles of comparative distributive justice apply only among those persons who share some form of association; humanists argue that some such principles apply among all human persons qua human persons. According to the “weak associativist” account that I defend, humanism is wrong, but so are current versions of associativism. Association is (...) necessary if talk of comparative distributive justice is to be apt, but no special form of it is required. Whether or not principles of comparative distributive justice do in fact apply to an association will depend on whether or not the conditions for legitimate enforcement of the resulting duties are satisfied, and we can expect these conditions to be satisfied by a wide range of associative forms. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 13, Issue 2, pp 161 - 186 Under which conditions does the relation between the levels of benefit and burden held by distinct individuals become a concern of justice? _Associativists_ argue that principles of comparative distributive justice apply only among those persons who share some form of association; _humanists_ argue that some such principles apply among all human persons _qua_ human persons. According to the “weak associativist” account that I defend, humanism is wrong, but so are current (...) versions of associativism. Association is necessary if talk of comparative distributive justice is to be apt, but no special form of it is required. Whether or not principles of comparative distributive justice do in fact apply to an association will depend on whether or not the conditions for legitimate enforcement of the resulting duties are satisfied, and we can expect these conditions to be satisfied by a wide range of associative forms. (shrink)

Philosophy professor, humorist, and identical twin Helena de Bres takes the curious, wondrous, ludicrous experience of being a twin as a lens through which to reconsider our place in the world and how we relate to others. Which one are you? Are you the same? Can you read each other's minds? Identical twins get the weirdest existential questions from strangers, also from loved ones, in fact, even from themselves. For twins fascinate all of us... including twins. For Helena de Bres, (...) this fascination was never far from philosophy's most unnerving unknowns. What makes someone themselves rather than someone else? What does perfect love look like? Can we really act freely? Drawing from her relationship with her own twin Julia, and accompanied by Julia's line drawings, Helena uses twinhood to rethink the limits of personhood, consciousness, love, freedom, even justice. With her inimitably candid, goofy, brilliant voice, she explores the long tradition of twin representations in art, myth, and popular culture; their "freakish" history; their peculiar social standing; and what it's really like to be one of two. With hope and humor, she argues that our reactions to twins reveal our broader desires and fears about selfhood, fate, and human connection, and that reflecting on twinhood can help each of us-twin and singleton alike-to recognize our own multiplicity, and approach life with greater curiosity, imagination, and courage. (shrink)